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Abstract 
 
 
Assisted by the rapid growth of digital technology, which has enhanced its ambitions, 
performance is an increasingly popular area of artistic practice. 
 
This paper seeks to contextualize this within two methodologically divergent yet 
complimentary intellectual tendencies. The first is the work of the philosopher Merleau-
Ponty, who recognized that our experience of the world has an inescapably ‘embodied’ 
quality, not reducible to mental accounts, which can be vicariously extended through 
specific instrumentation. 
 
The second is the developing field of neuroaesthetics, that is, neurological research 
directed towards the analysis, in brain-functional terms, of our experiences of objects and 
events which are culturally deemed to be of artistic significance. 
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I will argue that both these contexts offer promising approaches to interpreting 
developments in contemporary performance, which has achieved critical recognition 
without much antecedent theoretical support.  
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Introduction 
 
In this paper I intend to examine two different approaches to interpreting and analysing 
contemporary performance practice, examples of which I will furnish throughout my text. 
As I have mentioned, the first is contained within the writings of a philosopher, Merleau-
Ponty, working in the European phenomenological tradition, much of whose work 
predated our recently developed scientific capacity to investigate brain functioning. It 
should be added that the methods and premises of phenomenology have also to be 
distinguished from those of such experimental science. I believe that Merleau-Ponty has a 
dual role with regard to contemporary performance: at once, a thinker who anticipated a 
more intimate relationship between the body and technological instruments, and also a 
figure whose theorization might provide a clue as to why this relationship, as enacted in 
performance, seems so compelling.     
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The second is inferred from the accumulated insights, yielded by recent scientific 
investigation, into brain functioning, and its relationship to the structure of what we call 
consciousness, and in particular our powers of visual perception. I will attempt to argue 
that, as these insights appear to indicate that consciousness is a result of distinct but 
collaborative functions within the brain, we can interpret the effect of recent 
technologically enhanced performance on spectators in terms of non-conventional 
patterns of stimulation of these functions. These patterns may well not amount to giving a 
resulting conscious state, which, in the everyday uses of life, would be reliable or 
consistent. In other words, this recalcitrance to plain and unambiguous construal may be a 
necessary, though not sufficient, condition for our judgement that these experiences are 
of aesthetic significance, and, therefore, that the performances which give rise to them are 
themselves of artistic value. This field, covering the special cases of brain function 
examinable in encounters with objects or occasions of artistic value, is known by the 
generic title ‘neuroaesthetics’.    
 
Context 
 
I consider that performance, which in the past has seemed to be a challenging artistic 
zone between drama, dance and happening, has, in the last two decades, entered new 
territory.  As far as presentation goes, it seems to have developed from sporadically held 
events, staged in ‘real time’, in obscure venues, with the minimum of props, into multi-
media stagings, attracting large audiences and employing a panoply of technological 
devices. Its artistic ambitions, too, appear to have enlarged, embracing plurally-layered 
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content which attempts to address more elusive and broader themes, reflecting our 
enveloping experience of the contemporary world. Of course in this period there has been 
an increasing mainstream acceptance of stage practices which depart radically from 
textually-based drama or traditional dance, as witness the immense impact of the late 
Pina Bausch. But I think our changed technological resources constitute a critical factor 
in this evolution. The analogue processes of film and magnetic tape have frequently 
served in the past as components and amplification of live performance, but their 
relationship to the latter was one of simple synchronicity: they ran on their course 
inexorably, and the performer(s) would coordinate to a greater or lesser degree with them.  
 
After the mid- nineties, however, the development of digital processing facilitated an 
unprecedented interactivity between performer and device, bringing hugely increased 
computing power to these functions, and, in virtue of its ability to break down 
information into mutable combinations of bits, the opportunity to mould and sculpt, so to 
speak, the qualities of the presented material. Digital technology transformed a 
fundamentally passive, recipient relationship of performer to media devices, into one of 
reciprocity and joint enterprise. Now I do not intend to digress and to advance this claim 
into making any case regarding Artificial Intelligence theory, which seems to have 
offered a constant ‘false dawn’ of imminent discovery over the last twenty years or more. 
But I would suggest that, as a result of these developments, our sense of our bodily 
frontiers has undergone a radical enlargement, and so too has our conception of the 
‘incarnate’ nature of consciousness, in which respect I regard Merleau-Ponty’s 
theorization as prophetic. I also contend that the above-mentioned field of neuroaesthetic 
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analysis might provide some insight into why the more recondite instances of 
contemporary performance have the artistic value that we apparently accord to them.  
 
 
Merleau-Ponty and Embodied Perception 
 
Vision is not the metamorphosis of things themselves into the sight of them; it is not 
a matter of things’ belonging simultaneously to the huge, real world and the small, 
private world. It is a thinking that deciphers strictly the signs given within the body. 
(Merleau-Ponty, 1974: 292) 
 
Much  recent theoretical activity  has attempted to posit, or perhaps, restate, the 
importance of the body in aesthetics and perception. Naturally, the work of  Merleau-
Ponty has been frequently cited in this regard. It is as well to characterize his 
methodological context before summarizing his ideas. As a philosopher he inherited 
features of the project of European phenomenology, chiefly its commitment to attempting 
to describe the contents of consciousness directly, without trying to prune away unsafe 
knowledge claims (as previous philosophical tendencies had done), and also to take as its 
point of departure the acting subject, already engaged with, and directing different modes 
of attention onto, the world, rather than a passive, Cartesian, somewhat disembodied self, 
disinterestedly deriving conclusions about it. But the ambition of phenomenologists to lay 
bare a fundamental grammar of elements by which consciousness constructs a world has 
not been unproblematic, since the objects of such radical description are necessarily prior 
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to any constructed notion of proof-procedure. For this reason much European thought 
within this tradition has a ‘high ceiling’ of assertability, which, until recently, most 
thinkers within the Anglo-American analytical tendency would have dismissed as 
unproveable rhetoric (one could add that this cultural antipathy has been echoed in the 
attitude of some proponents of Anglo-Saxon textually dependent theatre towards the 
tradition of performance as it has evolved in European drama through the last century). 
Though the intellectual climate has become less starkly oppositional here, it has to be 
recognized that, whilst being aware of contemporaneous neurological research, Merleau-
Ponty does not write with the caution of a scientist, and as a phenomenologist, would 
consider science as very much an a posteriori construction, which makes a causal 
narrative to explain consciousness, rather than addressing it directly. It is unsurprising 
that Merleau-Ponty has probably received more attention from cultural and aesthetic 
theorists than from analytical philosophers. 
 
As might be evident from this description of method, phenomenologists inherited and to 
some extent held on to elements of post-Kantian idealism, which in turn accepted much 
of the dualism, injected into European thought by Descartes, of a-physical and non-
spatial mental stuff (res cogitans) contained within, and possessing, a physical, and 
spatially extensive body. Merleau-Ponty’s conspicuous departure was to reject this 
dualism in its entirety: for him, the ‘perceiving mind is an incarnated mind’ and there 
could be no meaningful talk of a mind having proprietorship of a body distinct in kind 
from itself. Among the consequences that flow from this position, I highlight these: 
firstly, as implied above, such an embodied mind is inescapably tied to ‘a system of 
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possible actions’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962:138), it is not commanding a ‘third personal’ 
body to do certain things which it has decided upon ‘by itself’; rather, it is involved in 
perception as it is ‘lived’ in the world, and is changing, adapting and perhaps renewing 
itself with the body (Merleau-Ponty, 2000: 209). In sum, powers of perception-in-general 
are not decanted into a certain set of physical sense-organs, they are inseparable from 
embodied experience. Secondly, this position rules out the notion of an interior ‘subject’ 
deriving conclusions about exterior ‘objects’ that affect it, including its own body, and 
also implicitly rejects any sense that our subjectivity has a stable and definite frontier 
with an external world, to which we can assign ‘our’ interpretations and meanings. 
Rather, these meanings are inseparable from that world, as Merleau-Ponty 
characteristically puts it: ‘I am not in front of my body, I am in it, rather I am it’, which, 
so to speak, interprets itself and is to be ‘compared, not to a physical object, but rather to 
a work of art … It is a focal point of living meanings’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962: 150-51). 
This position also rejects the prioritization of one term over another, whether in the 
plenary subjectivity of ‘Absolute Idealism’, or the plenary objectivity of ‘scientific’ 
physicalism.  
 
How can one associate these positions with the phenomenon of performance today? I 
suggest that there are, so to speak, three degrees of proximity: influence acknowledged by 
performer; concurrence of performer’s creative intent with previous theorization; use of 
such theories to retrospectively analyze performer’s work.  
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An example of the first degree lies in the work and writings of the performer Susan 
Kozel. As I have said, Merleau-Ponty’s non-dualistic stance entails a running together of 
domains, investing the mind into the body, and the body into the ‘outer’ world. In his 
later writings (Eye and Mind (1974), The Visible and The Invisible (2000)), he took the 
latter investment still further, using the phrase ‘the flesh of the world’ (2000, 248) to 
attempt to capture how the empathy with surroundings which we have to achieve in order 
to negotiate them, breaks down subject/object antinomy. ‘Flesh’, a membrane which ‘has 
no name in any philosophy’ (2000, 147), is ‘reversible’ (149); both object passively 
receiving sensation and subject actively giving it. It also has undefined horizons, ‘the 
flesh of the visible’ (136) entails its correlate in our invisible (to ourselves), yet 
apprehended carnal presence. 
 
In her book Closer (2007), Kozel consciously attempts to apply these later positions to 
the use of technology in performance. She considers Merleau-Ponty’s notion of ‘the 
invisible … significant to digital media because it challenges the supremacy and literality 
of vision’. His notion of ‘lived perception’ posits additionally a full integration of the 
senses, and accordingly she argues for media including ‘sound and haptics’ rather than 
mere ‘simplistic notions of moving images’. For her, the later (and uncompleted) 
theorization affords a groundwork for the inclusion in performance not only of ‘corporeal 
roots of vision but also kinetic and kinaesthetic qualities’ (2007, 40-41). 
 
Instances of both first and second degrees, acknowledged influence and concurrence in 
intent, can be found in the topic of instrumentation. Consequent on his notions of such 
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‘bodily plasticity’, it is natural that Merleau-Ponty saw how ‘the body adapts and in 
effect, extends itself through external instruments’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, 146); it invests 
itself into the tools and devices it uses, as a ‘virtual body’, its phenomenal place defined 
by task and location (25). A common demonstration of this is how one’s car becomes an 
‘outer skin’ when reversing into a small parking space.  
 
Such an everyday feature of consciousness has been dramatically exhibited by the 
development, enabled by digital processing, of magnetic or optical motion capture, now 
used widely in performance. Sensors are applied to the performer’s body, which then 
permit a ‘skeletal reading’ of their movement to be taken, which can then be ‘clothed’ by 
animation to produce an avatar. Kozel records her early improvisation with ‘mocap data’,                                 
where she experienced an ‘“open circuit” between her body and the figure’. Her avatar 
provided direct extensions of her movement, but there was no convergence ‘between her 
and the visible figure’. She adopts Merleau-Ponty’s term ‘encroachment’ to capture this 
symbiosis (2007: 230), and continues: 
 
The figure with which I perform is always at the same time both my own body and 
another body; it manages to be this because of the way I perceive the world 
dynamically while I am enmeshed within the world. If we follow Merleau-Ponty, 
perception is more than just the neurophysiological mechanisms by which I 
apprehend the world. Perception is constitutive of who and what I am, perception is 
ontological. 
(2007: 239) 
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Motion tracking gives the effect of a direct interface between the physical and virtual 
bodies, and so has been used especially in live performances, such as Merce 
Cunningham’s Biped (2000), where pre-recorded dancing avatars, rear projected onto a 
translucent screen, are made out of abstract images and figures hand drawn by Shelley 
Eshkar, animated by motion capture data provided by dancers other than those on stage.  
 
The second and third degrees of proximity are exemplified by the proliferation of other 
forms of digital instrumentation, notably, MIDI (musical instrument data interface), 
MAX (a real-time programming environment that has the special advantage of being 
interactive with visual and network technologies) and OSC (Open Sound Control)
1
. All of 
these are central to the performances of the renowned ensemble, Troika Ranch 
(Composer and Software Engineer: Mark Coniglio; Choreographer and Director: Dawn 
Stoppiello). They have pioneered the use of MidiDancer and Isadora software, which can 
interpret physical movements of performers so as to manipulate the accompanying sound 
and visual ambience in a variety of ways, enabling a dance theatre, in which captured live 
or pre-recorded images freeze, fragment, speed up, slow down, or warp in a shimmering 
effect. 
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Fig 1: Danielle Goldman in Surfacing (2004). Photo: Richard Termine 
 
At these degrees it can be argued that the legacy of Merleau-Ponty, filtering through 
practitioners’ own reading, and through critical theory courses and publications, has 
helped create a convincing apologia for what might otherwise be seen as inconsequential 
spectacles. Dying about two decades before technology made these possible, his attempts 
to address the embodied nature of consciousness in the everyday ‘lived’ world have 
themselves become incorporated into the world of artistic intent and analysis. If we take it 
as given that the new genres of performance, now multi-layered and multi-textual, have 
an artistic worth, which we intuit, but cannot explain in terms of the more cerebral and 
discursive criteria applied to traditional drama or dance, then I suggest that he provides at 
least some elements for such explanation: ‘we cannot imagine how a mind could paint; it 
is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world’ Merleau-Ponty, 
1974: 283).  
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I conclude this section with a brief consideration of examples which push the boundaries 
of the performer’s body into dimensions of, respectively, the mechanical, the semi-
intelligent and the biological.  
 
In performances by the Australian Cypriot artist Stelarc, the body is coupled with a 
variety of instrumental and technological devices that are appropriated by it. One such is 
Muscle Machine (2003), where he constructed an interactive and operational system in 
the form of a walking robot. Rubber muscles are inflated with air, and as one set of them 
lengthens, the other shortens, so as to produce movement, translating human bipedal gait 
into a six-legged insect like motion. 
 
 
 
 Fig 2: MUSCLE MACHINE, Gallery 291, London (2003). Photographer: Mark 
 Bennett. STELARC 
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The results of research into artificial intelligence have permitted the construction of 
avatars who respond to performers’ bodily presence in more colloquial ways. Jeremiah is 
one such, developed from ‘intelligent’ surveillance technology. In Blue Bloodshot 
Flowers (2001) his vast spectral face focuses on and tracks the movement of these like 
some deity, the figures he perceives being literally sub specie aeternitatis (‘under the 
gaze of eternity’).   
 
  
 
 
 Fig 3: Elodie Berland and Jeremiah from Blue Bloodshot Flowers, 291 Gallery, 
 London, 2001. Director: Susan Broadhurst. Technology: Richard Bowden, Image 
 by Terence Tiernan 
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Finally, and perhaps in fulfilment of Merleau- Ponty’s above-mentioned reference to the 
body as ‘a work of art’, Marta de Menezes considers that, in bioart practices, ‘we are 
witnessing the birth of a new form of art: art created in test-tubes’ (de Menezes, 2005).  
Since her first work of bioart, Nature? (2000), involving the microsurgical modification 
of live butterfly wing patterns, she has employed a variety of scientific technologies 
including images derived from her own brain FMRI in Functional Portraits (2002b), 
fluorescent DNA in NucleArt (2001) and protein synthesis in Proteic Portrait (2002c). 
 
 
Fig 4 Marta De Menezes NucleArt  2000-2002  
Human cell with painted chromosomes.  
Frame from video-installation, projected onto  
3D screens 
 
A Neuroaesthetic Approach: The Complexity of Perception  
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In the last thirty years neurological research has reached a point where we can examine in 
some detail the nature of brain activity involved in sustaining states of consciousness, and 
in directing different modes of attention towards particular features in the world. There 
seem to be three main zones of enquiry which such research has addressed: the 
relationship between various sensory stimuli and neural activity, the coordination of these 
to produce a coherent representation of the world, and the involvement of such factors as 
memory, expectation and imagination in interpreting it. Traditional empirical approaches, 
predating this research, would have regarded these three zones as very much sequential: 
stimulus-electronic impulse-coordination-interpretation. What is now apparent is that 
they are highly reciprocal. Stimuli are not received as discrete events to which 
interpretation is ‘applied’, rather they are sorted and enriched by use of associable 
memories (themselves often completed by imagination), and by expectations derived 
from these. Philosophers have called this condition ‘theory-laden-ness’, which implicitly 
rejects a notion, historically called ‘empirical atomism’ that we are immediately aware of 
interpretation-free data. As a result of this research, though we may be more intellectually 
aware of the distinction between what we see, and what we know and believe we see, 
(Gregory, 1998: 2), we cannot claim to be able, in attempting to introspect the fabric of 
our own consciousness, to separate the first from the second; we cannot directly access 
what can be called ‘pre-epistemic’ perception. This point exhibits conveniently the 
difference between scientific and phenomenological standpoints: science has provided an 
‘aetiology’, that is, a causal account of a phenomenon, but by its nature as a discipline in 
search of causes, cannot address it directly.  
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This is not to say that the two standpoints are innately opposed. As I said, Merleau-Ponty 
took a close interest in the neurological research of his time, and in one work (The 
Phenomenology of Perception) discussed the implications of a case of brain injury 
extensively. It could be said that phenomenology has served as a spotlight on features of 
consciousness which neuroscience has subsequently sought to explain; it has, in effect, 
directed lines of research without pre-empting their conclusions. For many neurological 
questions, conclusions have yet to be drawn; for instance, as regards our vision, there is 
still ‘no clear idea of how we see anything’ (Crick, 1994: 24). Certainly fragments of this 
process can be understood, but matters relating to colour interpretation, facial recognition 
and perception of motion still remain obscure.  
 
As a consequence of their abandonment, by different routes, of the above-mentioned 
‘atomistic’ model, the two approaches coincide on laying stress on our tendency to see 
complexes of stimuli rather than separate instances. We are disposed immediately to look 
for ‘images’ and ‘processes’ (using these terms across the senses) in uniting these stimuli, 
and the strategies by which we do so, are, of course, already laden with remembered 
experience (whether personal or evolutionary) and the symbolic values we have attached 
to these (in this regard Merleau-Ponty acknowledged  a debt to gestalt theory). What is 
epistemically ‘seen’ has thus pre-conformed to an acquired semiotic system. Clearly, 
unless brain injury or disease is present, we can distinguish between those images 
‘actually’ viewed which cannot be changed at will, and those, in imagination and 
memory, which generally can; but these are overlapping domains. Just as memory 
enriches perception, so perceived images can be used as material for recombinant, ‘new’ 
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imagery. This ability to be creative with imagery, to have an imagination, is a necessary 
condition for our developed understanding of the world, that is, cognition (Kosslyn and 
Koenig, 1992: 129; Kosslyn, Thompson and Ganis, 2010: 4).  
 
Turning to the special case of neuroaesthetics, as defined in my introduction, it is evident 
that its disciplinary aim, to provide ‘an understanding of the biological basis of aesthetic 
experience’ (Zeki, 1999: 2) presupposes that we already have a publicly accepted, 
linguistically useful concept of what it is to have such an experience. Neuroaesthetics 
intends to provide some account of the occurrence of the experience, not to redefine the 
concept in question. It is also, obviously, a sub-discipline of neurology, and though 
concerned with the differences as regards  brain-function between an ‘ordinary’ and an 
‘aesthetic’ experience, it cannot be assumed that these differences lie in different kinds of 
brain-function, rather, as I shall argue, they may lie in the same kind of function adapting, 
or failing to adapt, to different stimuli.   
 
Taking our leading sense, vision, as an example, it is relevant to briefly sketch out how 
complex these functions appear to be.  New research has shown that some areas of the 
brain involved in visual processing are ‘topographically organized’; that is, these areas 
use spaces on the brain’s surface to represent ‘space in the world’. When an object is 
viewed, the pattern of activity on the retina, converted into electronic impulses, is 
reproduced (though with some distortions) on this surface; literally presenting a ‘picture 
in your head’. Edward Smith and Stephen Kosslyn argue that: ‘brain areas support 
genuinely depictive representations’.  They suggest that a similar process occurs with 
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eyes closed and a remembered object visualized (Smith and Kosslyn, 2009: 16). These 
inputs from the retina seem to be connected only with a fairly localized area generally 
known as the ‘primary visual cortex’ or area ‘V1’ (Zeki, 1999: 15). Adjacent areas of the 
retina then connect with V1, recreating a visual map of the retina on the cortex. Though 
this system seems to be present at birth, it needs early exposure to the visual world to 
function fully (Zeki, 2009: 34). 
 
The perception of colour within this system is equally complex; our responsiveness to a 
particular range of light frequencies is an evolutionary accretion of brain activities 
confined to certain genera of animals, and not a direct encounter with any ‘objective’ 
characteristics of this range. Colour perception seems to be handled primarily by the ‘V4’ 
complex, located in the fusiform gyrus, together with specialized cells in V1, ‘V2’ and 
locations in the temporal lobe. Although it is possible to assign such a function to these 
areas, it does not follow that each of these is dedicated to this task alone. We know that 
from colour perception, form is inferred, then motion, a process taking approximately 80-
100 milliseconds (Zeki, 2009: 37-38). The brain is unable to combine these perceived 
features ‘instantaneously’; it takes this time to unify the results of processing into an 
integrated experience. The extraction of form from colour, entailing the perception of 
colorific boundaries is itself a separate process (Zeki, 1999: 195), whose operation in turn 
alters our response to colour: where we can see it as applied to objects, a process of 
‘colour constancy’ leads us to minimize its subsequent variations in different lights, 
making possible our perception of individual objects as being stably ‘coloured’ in a 
specific shade (Zeki, 2009: 29). Where we cannot see definite shapes, it seems that a 
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separate process for viewing abstract colour, known as ‘automatic computation’ takes 
place. This appears to be located in the middle frontal convolution
2
 of the frontal lobe, 
which may generally respond to the unusual or ‘irregular patterns’ of stimuli, (Zeki, 
2009: 16). 
 
 
 
Fig 5: Area V4 of the brain. Photo Courtesy of Professor Semir Zeki.  
From the Laboratory of Neurobiology at UCL, www.vislab.ucl.ac.uk 
 
This sketch supports two main points. Firstly, there seems to be no evidence for the 
notion of a ‘master area’ of the brain understanding all perceptions. For Zeki, such a 
notion is a ‘logical and neurological problem’, inasmuch as there would still be the 
question of who was ‘“looking” at the image from the master area’ (Zeki, 1999: 65). Such 
words seem to be the scientific echo of Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the concept of an 
interior subject inhabiting a sensing object. Specialized visual areas are interconnected, 
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all receiving and sending signals to each other but there is no pattern of connections with 
any one individual area receiving and understanding all information (Zeki 1999: 71). 
Secondly, the teleology, the implicit purpose of this complex, is that of mapping out a 
representation of a stable world of objects which is comprehensible and therefore 
negotiable in everyday life, or as Zeki puts it ‘we see in order to acquire knowledge of the 
world’ (4).  
 
Many thinkers, when seeking to define aesthetic experience, single out its non-utilitarian 
quality, claiming that an aesthetic experience of something is not that casual mode of 
attention that sees that thing as a tool or instrument to realize some given purpose; as an 
aesthetic object, in the widest sense, that thing resists being given pragmatic status: it is 
not a means, it is somehow an end in itself. I believe that neuroaesthetics may provide at 
least some underpinnings for this exemption, and in so doing, illuminates why certain 
technologically enhanced performances have the resonance that they do. I suggest that, 
whilst routine patterns of brain functioning support a mode of consciousness that enables 
us to survive in the world, the effect of such works is to disrupt and to disintegrate the 
ostensibly coherent representations this mode creates, whilst provoking from us an 
attempt at re-integration of these experiences ‘in another mode’. If, as Zeki argues, 
consciousness seems to be the seemingly unified result of a complex of mutually 
contributive, ‘micro-conscious’ processes, then in order to be effective, this disruption 
does not have to constitute a challenge to all of them, rather, it needs merely to activate 
some and not others. It both arouses and thwarts the promise of coherence. 
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I think a salient example of this is the Berlin ensemble Palindrome’s Shadows 
performances, where the traditional theatrical technique of ‘shadow play’ is combined 
with digital technology, particularly, motion sensing and real time audio image signal 
processing. By using such multilayered, distorted, and delayed effects, ‘integrated 
experience’ is denied to the spectator, and yet the audience’s active participation is 
sought in the production of meaning. For this ensemble such shadow performances are 
intended to be ‘a reminder of the organic connection between body-image and body-
reality’, exhibiting ‘the shifting border between body and mediated virtual body image’. 
The shadows shift seamlessly between what is ‘known’ and what is ‘surprising’ making 
‘the piece fascinating to watch’ (Dowling, Wechsler, and Weiss, 2004: 5).  
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 Fig 6: “Solo4>Three” (2003). Dance and Choreography:  Emily Fernandez.  
 Interactive video system: Frieder Weiss. Photo credit: Ralf Denke 
 
But performance can exploit unusual features of consciousness without such obviously 
challenging effects. Probably due to the adjacency of two differently functioning areas in 
the fusiform gyrus, some individuals, otherwise normal, experience sensations in 
modalities other than the modality that is being directly stimulated (Ramachandran and 
Hubbard, 2001: 4). Some visualize colours when they view numbers, others see distinct 
colours each corresponding to a musical note. This mingling of the senses or synaesthesia 
(from the Greek sun: joining and aisthesis: sensation), has historically been associated 
with creativity, and it seems to improve memory and linguistic development.  
 
Synaesthesia is a significant concept for the analysis of performances by Troika Ranch 
and Palindrome where the interaction of physical and virtual creates inclusive, jarring 
confusions of sensory inputs. We are accustomed to the intertwining of sensory terms in 
literary devices, such as Shakespearean metaphor, but these ensembles attempt a direct 
interplay of various sense-impressions, unsettling the audience and frustrating their 
expectations of any discursive interpretation. They endeavour to create the effect of 
cross-activation of discrete areas of the brain for those who do not possess it. 
 
It could be objected that if the only effect by performance on the brain is confusion then 
there is little to distinguish it from a range of narcotics. Not only would this assume 
prematurely that the brain-functional patterns for the two are alike or similar, but I 
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suggest that it would disregard the potency and subtlety of performance’s  techniques, 
particularly when technologically assisted. Traditional theatre, opera and dance offer 
highly formed, and frequently formalized representations which are parallel to our 
everyday world but share all of its perceptual features; the ‘suspension of disbelief’ lies in 
our attention to and identification with the narrative and its protagonists. Performance, I 
consider, has the capacity to ‘bracket off’ (to use a phenomenological phrase) certain 
layers and processes of consciousness for particular attention, and in so doing confronts 
the spectator with an externalised metaphor of his or her own ‘first personal’ experience. 
In effect we are offered a theatre of elements of our own consciousness. Memory and the 
act of remembering are explored in Troika Ranch’s The Future of Memory (2003) by 
means of a multi-layered collage of imagery and sound, the technology acting as a 
‘metaphor for memory’ itself. Using ‘Isadora in tandem with MidiDancer’, the 
performers, Stoppiello, Goldman, Szabo and Tillett, manipulate sounds and images in 
real-time; ‘floating in a chaotic world of movement video and sound, the four characters 
… swirl in and out of reality as they attempt to regain the memories that define who they 
really are’ (Coniglio and Stoppiello, 2011).  
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  Fig 7: The Company in Future of Memory (2003). Photo: Richard Termine 
 
Perhaps a more primitive layer of consciousness is exhumed by the same ensemble’s 16 
[R]evolutions (2006), where motion capture software enables the body to write itself in 
performance, exploring through choreography and interactive media the similarities and 
differences between human and animal, and the behavioural evolutions that both go 
through in a single lifetime.  
 
This notion of a theatre of our own experience reaches its consummation in Marta de 
Menezes’ Tree of Knowledge (2004-2005), which, combining imaging of neuronal cells 
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and tissue culture technologies, creates three-dimensional living sculptures.  Perhaps it 
could be said that here Merleau-Ponty’s assertion of the embodied nature of experience is 
confronted by a counter-example: we are presented with an object made from our own 
patters of brain functioning. Its effect is certainly one of defamiliarization . 
 
Conclusion 
 
As a separately acknowledged art form, performance has only existed for about a century, 
though it could easily be argued that elements of it were to be found in forms of drama, 
dance and ritual in previous ages. As a form significantly enhanced by technology, it is at 
most thirty years old. So its popular artistic acceptance seems to have run on ahead of any 
tradition of dedicated theorization, and realizing that its effects are not adequately 
addressed by much earlier critical discourse, practitioners and writers alike have cast 
around for sources which support and explain them. Merleau-Ponty’s writings have 
become one such, because he seems to offer both prescription and analysis of 
performance practice. Prescriptively, he has stimulated and informed the artistic intent of 
figures such as Kozel, who wish to develop work with renewed ways of using bodily 
presence. For the purposes of analysis, he has left materials which emancipate the 
spectator and critic from reliance on narrowly cerebral, literary criteria which tend to 
determine a search for verbalizeable narrative. In both cases he seems to fill out our 
lexicon of terms with fresh gradations of meaning.   
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The case of neuroaesthetics is quite different, in that as a field of study it is about as 
young as digital technology itself, and experimental research is still rapidly increasing. In 
the case of performance, the former’s disciplinary purpose (as Zeki puts it), to provide 
‘an understanding of the biological basis of aesthetic experience’, is directed to an art 
form which, though given this status, as I said, rather escapes received aesthetic criteria. 
So those fashionable experiments which ‘wire-up’ people’s brains when encountering 
conventionally lauded paintings and music, may not be easily applicable here, and in this 
paper I have argued by analogy, and do not aspire to offer proof derived from experiment. 
I suggest, however, that this discipline promises to indicate something of why we 
consider the effects of performance are ‘aesthetic’. Of course there are qualifications: 
there may be no one set of aesthetic qualities assignable to all performances (or to all 
instances of artifacts in any given medium, for that matter), accordingly we may find that 
spectator’s brain-function patterns are equally diverse, and we will probably find that the 
distinction between ‘ordinary’ and ‘aesthetically stimulated’ patterns is blurred. But with 
sensitive consideration of its findings, neuroaesthetics might prompt a renewed discourse 
within aesthetics itself.  
 
 
Notes
                                                 
1
 Open Sound Control was created by the Center for New Media and Audio Technologies 
(CNMAT) at the University of California, Berkeley in the 1990s. 
2
  One of the convex folds of the surface of the brain. 
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